INTRODUCTION

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The history of cultural anthropology has been sketched as a set of experiments involving liaisons between two disciplines, such as anthropology and religion, anthropology and biology, anthropology and linguistics, anthropology and history (Kuper 1999). In the present book—as well as in forthcoming volumes of the Berghahn Books series Studies in Rhetoric and Culture—we add to this experiment by bringing rhetoric and anthropology closer to each other than they have ever been before.

Many factors contribute to the shaping of human action, but rhetoric, we argue, is the decisive factor in the emergence of cultural diversity past and present. Inward and outward persuasion is the mother of invention, and it is our rhetorical genius that creates the “customs” and “lifestyles” of culture; the “folkways” and “mores” (William Sumner 1906), the “spirit” or “paideuma” (Leo Frobenius 1921); the “patterns” and “configurations” (Ruth Benedict 1934); the “ethos” and “eidos” (Gregory Bateson 1936, 1958); the “habitus” (Pierre Bourdieu 1977). Even the “codes,” “systems,” and “structures” analyzed by semiotics may be explained in these terms, for, as Clifford Geertz has observed, they are nothing but “webs of significance” we ourselves have spun (1973: 5). Just as there is no “zero degree rhetoric” in any utterance (George Kennedy 1998), there is no “zero degree rhetoric” in any of the patterns of culture.

Several scholars have criticized the notion of “culture” as inviting a particular form of reification and implying a Procrustean vision of human existence. For this reason, they even began to write against culture or urged abandonment of the concept altogether (Arjun Appadurai 1986, Lila Abu-Lugod 1991, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 2002). Yet, it seems to us that a more productive way would be to rethink the concept and locate culture in the domain where it ultimately belongs—that is, rhetoric.
Classical traditions of rhetoric tell us that invention is not the discovery of the new but rather the “coming-in” (in-venere) of what was already known. Creativity is enabled by tradition not as the burden of the past but as the means of the present and future. Contributors to *Culture and Rhetoric* acknowledge this constant flow and the emergence and disappearance of theories and their social and cultural contexts, and many of them discuss and make full use of classical theories of rhetoric, which since antiquity have emphasized the nexus of rhetoric and culture (see especially the chapters by Stephen Tyler and Ivo Strecker, Christian Meyer, Peter Oesterreich, Daniel Ross, Vicenzo Cannada Bartoli, Alan Rumsey, Philippe Salazar, and James Fernandez). Others have drawn on topical works of Western literature (Anthony Paul on William Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, and Paul Friedrich on Henry David Thoreau’s *Walden*), and on early and contemporary scholars in anthropology (see especially the good use Boris Wiseman has made of Claude Lévi-Strauss). In addition, most contributors have—explicitly or implicitly—made full use of recent and not so recent developments in anthropological linguistics, discourse analysis, and the ethnography of speaking.\(^1\)

The collocation *Rhetoric Culture*—used by the Rhetoric Culture project (see preface and chapter 1) and all the conferences it has held—also echoes *Writing Culture* (James Clifford and George Marcus eds. 1986), which rightly asked whether all ethnographies are not rhetorical performances determined by the need to tell an effective story. However, while rhetoric is the instrument with which we describe, it is also the means by which we create culture. Here we find a curious lacuna in most of the contributions to *Writing Culture*. No one dwells on the rhetoricality of culture. Yes, there are inklings of the role of rhetoric in social life, as when James Clifford approvingly quotes Victor Turner as saying that social processes are saturated “with a rhetoric, a mode of emplotment, and a meaning” (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 98). But the reference to Turner is then not used to reflect on the interaction of rhetoric and culture. Instead it is used to bolster the argument that ethnography itself is “a performance emplotted by powerful stories. Embodied in written reports, these stories simultaneously describe real cultural events and make additional, moral, ideological, and even cosmological statements. Ethnographic writing is allegorical at the level both of its content (what it says about cultures and their histories) and of its form (what is implied by its mode of textualization)” (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 98).

We share this rhetorical view of ethnography but add to it that “real cultural events” are not as real as they may seem, and that they must not be mistaken as being in any way more real than their representations. It is at this junction where Rhetoric Culture studies part from *Writing Culture* and embark on a course that explores the creative role of rhetoric in the emergence of
culture. Here we align ourselves with Dennis Tedlock and Bruce Mannheim, who in their introduction to *The Dialogic Emergence of Culture* (1995) have claimed that “cultures are continuously produced, reproduced, and revised in dialogues among their members” (1995: 2) and who argue that “Once culture is seen as arising from a dialogical ground, then ethnography itself is revealed as an emergent cultural (or intercultural) phenomenon, produced, reproduced, and revised in dialogues between field-workers and natives. The process of its production is of the same general kind as the process by which ethnic others produce the cultures that are the objects of ethnographic study” (1995: 2).

Tedlock and Mannheim also emphasize the role of “tacit collusion” in discourse. “All social events,” they write, “require the tacit collusion of the participants, who implicitly agree that they are interpreting the events within the same general framework. This interactional collusion is not socially neutral; rather, it involves a carefully crafted set of social repositionings in which dominance hierarchies emerge with the collusion (though not necessarily the consent) of the dominated” (1995: 13). Yet, although they are fully aware of the role of “collusion” in culture, none of the contributors to *The Dialogic Emergence of Culture* takes recourse to rhetoric, the discipline that since antiquity has been concerned with the ubiquity of inward and outward persuasion, and with the hidden agendas of interlocutors.

Because of the early and probing stage of our project, we invited scholars from different disciplines (anthropology, rhetoric, literature, linguistics, philosophy) to a first conference entitled “Rhetoric Culture Theory,” asking them to contribute whatever they thought appropriate. This resulted in a set of quite heterogeneous papers—some solicited at later stages—that are now distributed over three volumes of the *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture* series, each with its own focus (or better, foci). The volume edited by Michael Carrithers presents essays that show how the *vicissitudes of life* motivate rhetoric and are a source of cultural creativity; the volume edited by Christian Meyer and Felix Girke investigates *resonance* phenomena and the *rhetorical emergence of culture*; while the present volume centers on *chiasm* and *figuration*.

Coming, as it does, from a conference on general theory, the book is naturally more about broad theoretical issues than about analyzing ethnographic cases in detail. Several chapters—for instance those by Gross, Friedrich, Herzfeld, Hariman, Paul, Rumsey, and Salazar have a strong empirical ingredient, but readers who look for more elaborate examples of what a rhetorical theory of culture can contribute to ethnographic practice will have to wait for further volumes in the *Studies in Rhetoric and Culture* series. These will be about rhetoric in social relations, in economic life, in political style, religion, and the
like, and they will focus, as the publisher’s flyer says, “on concrete practices of
discourse in which and through which cultures are performed, contested, and
reproduced.”

The present volume divides into two parts, each centering on one of two
themes, which right from the beginning have inspired and given momentum
to the Rhetoric Culture project.

Chiasm (Part I) played already a central role in our first workshop at the
5th Biennial Conference of the European Association of Social Anthropolo-

gists (1998) when we invited scholars “to help overcome the state of limbo in
which cognitive, symbolic, dialogic, and all sorts of discursive anthropologies
had left us,” and “to provide a new—or rather very old—direction and sense
of relevance to the study of culture by retrieving, exploring and making full
use of the ancient insight that just as rhetoric is founded in culture, culture is
founded in rhetoric.”

Later, during the subsequent conferences, the topic widened and we began
to focus both on the chiastic relationship between rhetoric and culture (see
especially the chapters by Stephen Tyler and Ivo Strecker, Christian Meyer,
Vincenzo Cannada Bartoli) as well as other chiastic phenomena in thought
and culture (see the chapters by Boris Wiseman and Anthony Paul).

Figuration (Part II) provides, as the title of Philippe-Joseph Salazar’s es-
say puts it, a common ground for rhetoric and anthropology. For a long time
already, rhetoricians as well as anthropologists have been interested in figura-
tion (metaphor, allegory, the theory of tropes), and these topics figured large
in the works of James G. Frazer (1890, 1927), Franz Boas (1911, 1940), and
Paul Radin (1945, 1950). But only the “metaphoric turn” in the middle of the
twentieth century gave a crucial impulse that brought research on figuration
in thought and culture to the forefront of anthropology.2

The first publication in anthropology to carry both “metaphor” and “rhet-
oric” in its title was The Social Use of Metaphor: Essays in the Anthropology of
Rhetoric (1977) edited by David Sapir and Christopher Crocker. This book was
dedicated to Kenneth Burke, and showed, both theoretically and empirically,
how metaphors are not only “good to think with,” “good to speak with,” or
“good to write with” but are especially “good to live by,” as George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson were to put it a few years later (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

Giambattisto Vico demonstrated already long ago (see Christian Meyer in
this volume) that analogy is perhaps the most evident form in which rhetoric
manifests itself in culture. Ethnographies of magic, ritual, religion, art, and
practically all other domains of culture typically abound with the rhetorical
use of analogy.

For this reason Tim Ingold has called analogy the “drive of culture.” “The
essence of culture,” he writes,
lies in a uniquely human capacity to recognize and exploit likeness, or, in other words, to operate analogically. To construct an analogy (or metaphor) is to establish a relation between phenomena drawn from different domains of experience, in terms of a perceived similarity. Any real-world object, as it is caught up in the nexus of analogical relations, can become a symbol. We can discover the meanings of symbols by attending to the multiple social contexts in which they are used: what each symbol does is to bring together these contexts into a single focus, the greater the symbolic resonance of the object by which it is represented. In the course of social life, new analogic linkages are forever being forged against the background of existing convention, only to become conventional in their turn: thus over time the meanings of symbols change. The analogic drive, in short, is the very motor of the cultural process. (Ingold 1994: 334)

To this we may add that the study of tropes also allows us to see the wide margin of indeterminacy and interpretative leeway in communication, because people do not and cannot always know how to say properly what they think. By the same token, they do not and cannot always fully know what others mean by what they say. These seeming shortcomings in natural communication can in turn be—and in fact often are—exploited rhetorically. Figuration is a prime example of this, because when people create figures they create semantic collocations that resist univocal interpretation and therefore have an element of the “fantastic.”

Like the mythical trickster, rhetoric allows us to turn fact into fiction and fiction into fact. It tempts us to persuade ourselves—and others—to see and feel what we wish, and it leads us to limitless flights of fancy. By means of rhetoric we create phantasms, by means of rhetoric we act like demons, and by means of rhetoric we conjure up those ideas, values, moral rules, and laws that constitute the basis of culture.

And then again, it is the use of tropes that leads us to intimations of transcendence (see the chapter by Paul Friedrich) and guides our understanding of ephemeral forms of experience.

Part I, The Chiasm of Rhetoric and Culture, opens with “The Rhetoric Culture Project,” a short essay in which Stephen Tyler and Ivo Strecker reflect on the chiastic relationship between rhetoric and culture, and argue that it is time for anthropology to turn to rhetoric. Then follows an exposition of the epistemological issues involved in the juxtaposition of rhetoric and culture, both as objects and as instruments of discourse, ending with a pragmatic model that illustrates how cultures are interactive, autopoetic, self-organized configurations.
The chapter stresses the constitutive role of inward and outward rhetoric in the development of culture and the self and provides a sketch of Don Quixote de la Mancha as a paragon of rhetoric culture. The essay ends by returning to its initial theme, the relevance of Rhetoric Culture studies in periods of uncertainty.

In the second chapter, entitled “Precursors of Rhetoric Culture Theory,” Christian Meyer, one of the core group that helped develop the Rhetoric Culture Project at the university of Mainz, retrieves crucial ideas of the past. He reviews those major landmarks in the history of rhetoric and ethnography that are particularly relevant for a rhetorical theory of culture, and he notes that the Sophistic movement—so important to the development of rhetoric—was the result of culture contact.

Their trading and confrontation with other peoples made the Greeks realize that the variety of styles of life, moral values, and traditions are a product of human rather than divine agency. Consequently, Isocrates, Protagoras, and other Greek rhetoricians emphasized the intersubjective character of truth and the importance of commonsense understanding. Cicero and Quintillian elaborated on these ideas, stressing the pedagogical role of rhetoric and its power to produce and reproduce civilization. Interestingly, we can detect here also the age-old presumptuousness that attributes superior knowledge to the rhetor who uses his or her special skills to lead other people out of their “brutish existence” and turn them into “responsible citizens.”

Bacon and Vico also adhered to the idea that cultures pass through different stages of development, but more importantly they introduced the notion of culture-as-allegory. They saw cultural history, Meyer says, as a product of fantasy and poetic imagination. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer later held a similar view but added the provocative thesis that speaking subjects are themselves as figurative as the languages they speak. Governed not by reason but by irrational phantasms and inexplicable desires, human “will” is here understood to be the true source of all agency and history.

Following this continuing theme of rhetoric, scholars of the twentieth century explored the mediating role of rhetoric in culture. Meyer recalls how Burke developed the concepts of identification and psychic consubstantiality to explicate how rhetoric contributes to socialization, and how Blumenberg illuminated the constitutive role of rhetoric in culture by pointing out that “rhetoric creates institutions where there are no evidences.” Kennedy, who inaugurated a new comparative rhetoric at the end of the twentieth century and therefore receives Meyer’s special attention, did not speak of the rhetorical “will” but of rhetorical “energy” instead. Rhetoric is here defined as mental and emotional energy transmitted through communication, which is psychologically prior to an utterance and manifests itself not only in humans but in all social animals as well.
Meyer ends with an interesting turn to ethnography and shows how Rhetoric Culture ethnography was foreshadowed in the early work of Lafitau and Leenhardt, who learned from the (nonliterate!) people whom they studied how the word—that is rhetoric—plays a central role in the creation of culture.

While Meyer offers a diachronic view of the relevance of rhetoric for the study of culture, Peter Oesterreich, who is counted as one of the major figures in German rhetorische Anthropologie (see Gross, this volume), draws on classical rhetoric to demonstrate in “Homo Rhetoricus” how rhetoric is not only a means of communication with others, but also an instrument for shaping the self. Rhetoric is basically an appropriation and elaboration of practices inherent in language competence, and the five rhetorical arts are a heuristic key to the fundamental rhetorical competencies of everyday speech, indexing conventions that underlie the specific, common understandings that function as sources of everyday arguments.

Thus inventio illustrates the speaker’s competence to invent or find appropriate arguments, and includes such items as subject, media, negotiation, and parties. Competence to order or organize arguments and topics is the heuristic of dispositio, which in turn is reflected in the competent use of tropes. Memoria is the competence to remember, and actio is the competence to perform. Oesterreich emphasizes throughout his chapter this relation of rhetorical categories to common, everyday thought and speech. Thus the traditional rhetorical triad of movere, delectare, and docere are merely elaborations of commonplace activities that involve “persuading,” “pleasing,” and “teaching” respectively. In emphasizing this idea of rhetorical practice as nontheoretical discourse, he underscores one of the themes of Cannada Bartoli’s chapter concerning the experiential basis of the rhetoric of practice.

Daniel Gross, trained as classical rhetorician both in the United States and in Germany, focuses on “listening culture” as a neglected concept in both rhetoric and anthropology. He first raises questions about how we “hear” our own culture through personification, ethos, and the anxiety of influence, and then summarizes recent work in the Germanic tradition of rhetorische Anthropologie. He notes the inherent dilemma of universalism and particularism entailed by the conjunction of rhetoric and anthropology, and he argues that rhetoric, as a “supplement” to anthropology, runs the risk of losing its identity. Partly for this reason, he rejects the idea of building rhetorical anthropology on the model of philosophical anthropology. As for the rhetorical turn in anthropology and the anthropological turn in rhetoric, he notes that it is an incomplete project that has had little influence so far outside the Germanic context. He is nonetheless optimistic about the general direction of rhetorische Anthropologie.

The main section of Gross’ chapter opens with the question, “What would rhetoric culture look like from the perspective of the auditor rather than the
speaker?” At the heart of this question is a complex of associations in which listening is thought to be largely passive, receptive, mimetic, and consequently, feminine. Countering these associations are the ideas of “active listening” and the “auditor-as-judge,” both of which make listening agentive and critical. Gross argues that the active/passive dyad explicit in the ideas of speaker and hearer, can be overcome by focusing on what he calls the “public ear,” the “technological ear,” the “alienated ear,” and the “socially deaf ear.” With respect to these points he critically examines some seventeenth-century sermons and treatises on listening and finds strong arguments for the listener’s agency in the construction and interpretation of discourse.

Anthropologist/philosopher Vincenzo Cannada Bartoli opens his essay “Practice of Rhetoric, Rhetoric of Practice” with a chiasmus, but he claims that only the first half of this chiasmus has been the object of theory. With Aristotle, he argues that the latter half is not learned through theory but rather is acquired through experience and practical mastery. The Aristotelian concept of phronesis as practical wisdom illustrates the case. In addition to phronesis, Aristotle attributed a moral dimension (arête) to practice. These ideas thus referenced a wider community as both the source and the justification for rhetorical practice. Cannada argues that the Marxist idea of praxis has a similar reference. Gramsci, for example, gave praxis two meanings. On the one hand, it referred to practices that transform the world, while on the other hand it referred to the “mass man” unconscious of his potentially transformative powers.

It seems that practice has three different roots: the first as the opposite of theory, the second as right conduct, and the third as practical wisdom. Cannada Bartoli identifies another chiasmus involving ethos and kairos. While ethos molds individuals and individuals mold ethos, kairos suggests something akin to “strategy” and thus implicates “agency,” indeterminance, and the use of ruses. Cannada then argues that this perspective from rhetorica utens is more fruitful than rhetorica docens, which focuses on form rather than use.

By way of conclusion, Cannada Bartoli turns to empirical issues of social description, which lie, as he says, at the core of ethnography. He provides the example of ritual in a small contemporary Italian village, where problems of interpretation abound because local commentaries are often multivocal and saturated with “implicatures.” Even more perplexing is ellipsis as part of a “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric,” which Cannada Bartoli noted—but could not pin down—in an old woman’s gesture of dismissal.

The last two chapters of Part I deepen our understanding of chiasmus, which has played a central role already in the preceding chapters. Boris Wise-
mus inspires most, if not all of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ thought and writing. He focuses on the moment when the “rhetoric of ethnography” converts into the “ethnography of rhetoric” and discovers chiasmus as inhering in all the themes that characterize Lévi-Strauss’ most important works.

Wiseman traces chiastic processes of inverted parallelism or inverted symmetry in which two terms offer an inverted image of one another through several of Lévi-Strauss’ well-known oppositions, such as “painting and music,” “cold and hot societies,” “ritual and game,” and shows how Lévi-Strauss construes anthropology as a chiastic inversion of self and other. In the imagery of a canoe voyage, Lévi-Strauss moves through a transitional group of myths that constitute a schema in which, as one travels from the “near” to the “far,” the values of these poles reverse so that the “near” becomes “far” and the “far” becomes “near.” Wiseman details the characteristics of this canoe journey in terms of the chiastic opposition and reversal in myths and, in the end, effectively shows how it parallels Lévi-Strauss’ major concerns in anthropology.

Building on his earlier study The Torture of the Mind, Anthony Paul—a literary scholar as well as a painter—explores in “When Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair: Lessons from Macbeth” the role of chiasmus in the drama of life and examines chiasmus as a rhetorical device for literary production and a form of mental and emotional experience in the work of Shakespeare.

In Macbeth, where it is the key to understanding the meanings of the play, chiasmus occurs in the form of mental estrangement, ironies, reversals, opposites, and contradictions. The famous chiastic line “fair is foul and foul is fair,” uttered by the three witches, constitutes a paradox, a conundrum in which the individual elements are irresolvable. This language of contradiction characterizes Macbeth’s inner hell in which there is no firm ground for action. The whole play is a series of such chiasmi, which Paul identifies in the patterning of deaths that re-echo one another throughout the play. Thus, in each of his murders Macbeth kills a part of himself. The death of Banquo is the central murder and the play’s turning point where darkness moves toward light and social instability is replaced by stability.

In addition, Paul shows how the collision of primitive and advanced culture in Macbeth is a basic underlying chiastic theme that also appears in different forms in several of Shakespeare’s other plays. The characters Othello and Iago, and Hamlet and the ghost of his father are prominent examples of this chiasm. Paul concludes with an account of how chiasm allows us not only to produce but also to discover meaning.

Part II, Figuration: The Persuasive Power of Deeds and Tropes, begins with a chapter by Alan Rumsey, who is well known for his work in anthro-
polological linguistics. In “Rhetoric, Truth, and the Work of Trope” he surveys a wide range of writings in classic and modern rhetoric, pragmatics, and the philosophy of language in search of a transformed, nondualistic understanding of language, which does not, as he says, “give pride of place” to truth-functional aspects of language or “devalue others as mere rhetoric.” Generally, he argues for a study of the persuasive functions of language that takes into account that “speech-act types and communicative genres vary cross-culturally, both with respect to their distinctive formal features and with respect to their imputed pragmatic effects.”

To substantiate the view that the work of trope is central to an understanding of language and culture, Rumsey then goes on to analyze macrotropes in ethnographic writing. He recalls Thornton’s idea of “classification” as the means by which an ethnographic text builds up an image of the social whole. Although he finds Thornton’s original formulation useful, he argues that there are other macrotropes that organize ethnographies, not all of which create images of a social whole. Instead of the part-to-whole trope discerned by Thornton, some ethnographies are cast (and thereby cast the social field) in terms of 1) mediating relations between social “systems,” 2) whole-to-whole relations, or 3) “fragment-to-fragment” relations. Rumsey illustrates these different kinds of textual macrotropes through the analysis of four classic ethnographies, respectively: Radcliffe-Brown’s *Three Tribes of Western Australia*, Evans-Pritchard’s *The Nuer*, Geertz’s *The Religion of Java*, and Tsing’s *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen*.

He argues that Radcliffe-Brown’s writing strategy accomplishes a sense of wholeness through the technique of retrospective lines that link different sections of the text, each of which describes a certain range of sociocultural phenomena, which it treats as a distinct “system.” This web of internal cross-reference creates an image of society as a set of interlocked relations. Evans-Pritchard, by contrast, enables a more open-ended, actor-oriented kind of cohesion by convincing us that Nuer themselves use their concepts of time and space, and of lineage structure, to mediate between distinct systems (the former to mediate between the “oecological system” and the “social system” and the latter to mediate—within the social system—between the “political system” and the “territorial system”).

Geertz, on the other hand, links different levels by means of a whole-to-whole macrotrope, which he portrays as one that is used by the Javanese themselves to create the presumed social whole. A single small ceremony practiced at the village level functions as a “key symbol,” or, as Geertz (1960: 11) put it, “a kind of social universal joint, fitting the various aspects of social life and individual experience together in a way that minimizes uncertainty, tension and conflict, or at least it is supposed to do so.”
In effect Rumsey’s analysis of “ethnographic macro tropes” deals with the use of the classical tropes at the level of the whole text rather than in the inter-animation of utterances. His use here generally parallels that of Pepper’s “root hypotheses” of “formism,” “mechanism,” and “contextual organicism,” as these are discussed in Fernandez’s chapter.

Philippe-Joseph Salazar—who holds the only African chair of rhetoric and combines deep knowledge of both anthropology and classical rhetoric—explicates in “Figuration, A Common Ground of Rhetoric and Anthropology” how figures, figurations, and fiction penetrate culture. He focuses on social agency and the role of rhetoric in social action. He also addresses the question of disciplinary boundaries, borders, and invasions manifest in the use and misuse of rhetoric in other disciplines, and although he recalls earlier misunderstandings, even hostility, he notes that more recently “a certain amount of respect, trust, admiration even, has begun to manifest itself” within academia, a point that is of great importance given the interdisciplinary ambitions of the Rhetoric Culture project.

Salazar emphasizes the role of figuration as a departure from or a reshaping of taken-for-granted distinctions, and he regards fiction as the construction of persuasive scenarios that become common knowledge. In a brief analysis of Bourdieu and Mauss, he notes their respective uses of fiction and figuration and then, as an example of “how anthropology and rhetoric can find fertile common ground on the question of figuration,” he proceeds to a discussion of the way these configuratons function in the discourse of “reconciliation” in South Africa. He argues that this discourse is a model of the common ground between the disciplines of anthropology and rhetoric. The figuration of “exoneration” was the main point of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Perpetrators of gross abuses of civil rights were brought before the commission to express repentance and to solicit forgiveness. In a theatrical setting, these public figures performed a figuration of conformance to, and confirmation of, the logos.

Finally, Salazar calls attention to the fact that since its inception in ancient Greece, rhetoric has carried within itself the spirit of democracy, and he warns against an “instrumentation of rhetoric” that applies the latter to an analysis of local cultures without any awareness of the pedagogical, democratic project enshrined in the concept of rhetoric.

“Tropical Foundations and Foundational Tropes of Culture” by James Fernandez follows an invitation of the editors not to focus—as in his earlier pioneering work—on the “play” but on the “foundational” role of tropes in culture. In order to achieve this, Fernandez examines the foundational concepts in contemporary tropology, and argues that tropes in their various forms are ways of attempting to control the flux of social life. He traces the historical-
philosophical foundations of recurrent “master tropes” from their origins in pre-Socratic writings through Vico to the present. He outlines Pepper’s idea of “root hypotheses,” which represents tropes as being either “analytic” or “synthetic,” the former comprising “formist” and “mechanist” tropes and the latter the tropes of “contextualism” and “organicism.”

In addition to Bakhtin’s dualistic chronotopes of time and space, he notes the dichotomizing tendency in contemporary foundational accounts that inscribe characterological oppositions between Northern and Southern peoples or between “soul and system” or “spirit and system.” Such oppositions frequently inspire or enable dialectical resolutions.

Among psychobiological and cognitive foundations he isolates the tropes of “association,” “collective representation,” “laws of thought,” and “primitive mentality” as these are represented particularly in psychoanalysis and structuralism. These tropes have in common the search for underlying realities that are obscured by surface representations. He concludes with a discussion of contemporary cognitive approaches as these are represented primarily in Lakoff and Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By.* At the end of his essay, Fernandez argues that the search for foundations is not a primary goal of anthropology. Anthropologists are more interested in how tropes “play” in the negotiation of commitments.

Michael Herzfeld, a scholar of Mediterranean societies and heir to many of Vico’s original ideas, rethinks in “Convictions: Embodied Rhetorics of Earnest Belief” some of his earlier theoretical explorations of poetics in social relations. He identifies the conjunction of symbolism and materialism as the central issue in the production of ethnographies. This idea is captured by the concept of “social poetics,” an idea that he prefers to “rhetoric culture” on the ground that it is less susceptible to reification. His essay focuses on the idea of “conviction” and the role of “disclaimers” as ironic modes in the performance of “sincerity.” Master symbolic forms of morality give the appearance of addressing moral issues, but are actually duplicitous. Duplicity in discourse involves the management of appearances where “conviction” is a matter of performance rather than belief.

His evidence derives from Italian and Greek usages in which people are understood to be imperfect. Consequently, failure to observe moral principles is to be expected, and the means of reconciling these failures requires techniques for “papering over” the differences. The successful mastery of these techniques trumps ideas of transparency, honesty, and sincerity. Infractions are justified in the name of some greater good. Since meaning is contingent and unstable over time, the principles of sincerity and authenticity are contextualized. Dissimulation, in particular, is acceptable in defense of family interests. In the end, Herzfeld concludes that sincerity is communicated most effectively by
means of gesture and bodily movement. It is a performance rather than a belief and it confirms the adage, “It’s not so much what he said, but how he said it.”

In a short, provocative essay called “An Epistemological Query” Pierre Maranda raises three interesting issues that involve unspoken meaning and address some of the standard assumptions about rhetoric and communication generally. He calls these the “minimal audience,” the “minimum speech,” and “nonhuman rhetoric.” In the first case, the speaker and the hearer are one and the same. This is similar in its implications to the idea of “shaping the self” in Oesterreich’s chapter. The second issue invokes the notion of response. Maranda asks what are the different implications of a speech event that requires a response and one that does not and indirectly points to context as the crucial element—that which allows one to understand what is meant but not said, what is implied but not explicit.

On the topic of animal communication, Maranda argues that much animal communication can be seen as rhetorical. Here his argument parallels the ideas about animal and insect communication discussed in Kennedy’s text on comparative rhetoric (see also Meyer’s and Rumsey’s essays). As in that work, Maranda traces a cline of kinds and modes of rhetoric that characterize human/human, human/animal, and animal/animal communication.

Although he does not himself say so, Paul Friedrich—known for his fine analysis of language, literature, and culture—leads us in his essay “Beyond the Unsaid: Transcending Language Through Language” toward an understanding of an issue that lies at the very heart of the Rhetoric Culture project. Unlike earlier anthropological researches in conceptualization, classification, and cognition, and also unlike more recent investigations of the constitutive role of tropes in culture, rhetoric culture studies also aim to understand how “unspeakable”—even “unthinkable”—realms of our existence are addressed rhetorically, and how culture-specific intimations of transcendence are created. Moral values, ethical doctrines, and religious beliefs are grounded in such “intimations,” which by their very nature evade plain style and are only accessible indirectly, that is, through evocation.

Friedrich provides a thorough analysis of the ways in which such “intimations of the unmanifest beyond the manifest” can be achieved. He uses the writings of Thoreau as exemplary instances of texts that achieve a kind of ontological transcendence. Seven figurative uses of language are at work here, and of these, three defy analogy and four resist closure.

Friedrich illustrates resistance to analogy by outlining the techniques Thoreau used to challenge the oversimplifications of analogy. Mysterious images and disintegrative images mix and deconstruct the terms of an analogy and in so doing open up intuitions of the unmanifest. “Dialectical contrast” is another way to suggest what analysis fails to provide. Two or more images or
metaphors may mingle and suggest transcendence, as, for example, in the climactic metaphors of process and stasis. The “unacceptable signified,” as exemplified in various triadic structures, is another means for suggesting what could never be literal.

There are three ways of resisting closure. The infinite sentence meanders or crowds the page with lists and thus suggests an infinitude of possibilities. Thematic oxymorons and the space between juxtaposed opposites are other ways of resisting closure and suggesting the unmanifest. Deliberately ambiguous rhetoric that encourages multiple interpretations also opens up closure.

Friedrich concludes by limning six negative uses of language that ultimately deny the possibility of meaning in language. Against these negative uses he suggests positive alternatives, all of which enable transcendence. The figurative energies of language overcome the negative uses and enable both communication and meaning. By means of the seven figurative uses outlined above, the infinite and divine plenitude of language reaches into the unmanifest beyond the manifest.

The book closes with a kind of “fanfare” by Robert Hariman—a scholar of rhetoric and public culture—who in “Future Imperfect: Imagining Rhetorical Culture” characterizes (tongue in cheek?) the tendencies and aims of the Rhetoric Culture project as excessively ambitious. He initially notes that excess is always scandalous because it destabilizes the social order and reveals human society as a complex of conventional rather than universal truths, and then he goes on to say that anthropology and rhetoric are similarly constrained and enabled by relativism.

After briefly recalling the scene of the Rhetoric Culture conferences with their excess of jumbled symbols, mixed artifacts, and conflicting themes, Hariman identifies these elements as figures in the trope of “allegory” that enacts multiple interpretations. He cites Nietzsche and Blumberg with respect to the use of extravagant means as supplements to the cognitive deficiencies that characterize human understanding, and he finds this same relation between cognitive deficiency and discursive excess in the work of anthropologists where “semiotic excess and cultural pluralism combine to dislodge any claim to a universally valid hierarchy of morals, knowledge, art, politics.”

Rhetoric Culture studies, he says, operate in the chasm between parodic and catastrophic projections in the realm of a “future imperfect” that fuses excess and deficit. Although he acknowledges parody as a way of exposing the false claims of foundationalism and deploys catastrophe as a way of revealing limitations on the power of humans to remake nature and themselves, Hariman throughout argues for allegory as the trope that helps us to imagine some kind of utopia, for when cultures function well, he says, they are like “large allegorical works and provide the artistic context for all of life.”
Notes


2. Most important was Ivor Richards. In his lectures on *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936/1965) he introduced the terms *tenor* and *vehicle* to analyze the internal dynamics of metaphorical expression and offered not only a new “anatomy of metaphor”—as David Sapir later on was to call it—but also helped to better understand the problem of “coping with metaphor.” The *similarities* and *disparities* between *tenor* and *vehicle* that we encounter in metaphor only allow unstable, multivocal interpretations, which people often find disturbing even though it is impossible to live without them. Richards, for whom the true work of words was “to restore life itself to order” (1965: 134), therefore spoke of the *command* of metaphor. Metaphors *command* interpretations, which in turn “can go deeper still in the control of the world that we make for ourselves to live in.” Note how close he also was to the idea of *rhetoric culture* when he wrote: “Thus in happy living the same patterns are exemplified and the same risks of error are avoided as in tactful and discerning reading. The general form of the interpretative
process is the same, with a small-scale instance—the right understanding of a figure of speech—or with the large scale instance—the conduct of a friendship” (1956: 136).


References


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